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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FUNERAL DIRECTORS & 
EMBALMERS ASSOCIATION, a 
Utah corporation, on behalf of its 
members, and on behalf of others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs-Appellant, 
vs. 
MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE 
VALLEY, INC., a Utah corporation; 
MEMORIAL TRUSTS, INC., a Utah 
corporation; LAKE HILLS, a Utah 
corporation; AULTOREST MEMOR-
IAL CORPORATION; a Utah cor-
poration; HAL S. BENNETT, DON-
ALD HACKING and RAYMOND W. 
GEE, members of the Business Reg-
ulation Commission of the State of 
Utah; and VIRGIL L. NORTON, 
Commissioner of Insurance of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 
10236 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS HAL S. BENNETT, 
DONALD HACKING AND RAYMOND W. GEE, members 
of the Business Regulation Commission of the State 
of Utah; and VIRGIL L. NORTON, Commissioner of 
Insurance of the State of Utah 
Said defendants-respondents will be referred to in this 
brief as the Public Officer ;Defendants. 
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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This was an action in the lower court seeking a declar-
atory judgment requesting that certain business practices 
of the corporate defendants be declared illegal; that those 
business practices involved violations of professional and 
ethical conduct regulations for embalmers and funeral di-
rectors as provided .for in Sections 58-9-10 and 22 of the 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and also violations of the Pre-
Arranged Funeral Plans law as contained in Section 22-4-4, 
Chapter 39, Laws of Utah 1955 and as amended in Chap-
ter 45, Laws of Utah 1957. Plaintiffs further sought a 
declaratory judgment decreeing that the pre-need (!Ontracts 
(R. 8-12, 19-20 and 39-41) issued and sold by the defen-
dants, and through their associates, are insurance con-
tracts, in consequence of which said contracts and the de-
fendants would be subject to the insurance regulations of 
the State of Utah supervising said contracts as insurance 
contracts and said defendants as insurance companies. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was brought before the lower court for a 
determination of the issues on a motion for a summary 
judgment ( R. 32-35) asking for a declaration: 
(a) That a licensed embalmer or funeral director 
performing services pursuant to a pre-need contract ob-
tained by solicitation is guilty of unprofessional and un-
ethical conduct as defined in Sections 58-9-10 and 22 of 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 and subject themselves to a 
possible revocation of their license. 
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(b) That pre-need contracts providing future fun-
eral services such as those used by the defendants are in-
surance contracts and are not legally issued unless the com-
pany issuing the same qualifies as an insurance company 
under the insurance laws of Utah. 
(c) That pre-need contracts are in violation of law 
unless they provide that all the earnings and interest on 
monies paid in shall be held in trust until death of bene-
ficiary and paid to no other person but the named payor 
as provided in Sections 22-4-1 to 22-4-7 as enacted by Chap-
ter 39, Laws of Utah 1955 and as amended in Chapter 45, 
Laws of Utah 1957. 
The matter was argued before the court without in-
troduction of further evidence. The defendants raised the 
issues of, and challenged (a) the constitutionality of por-
tions of the Pre-Arranged Funeral Plan law in Title 22, 
Chapter 4, supra; and (b) whether or not there was a justi-
ciable issue between the plaintiffs and the defendants and 
the capacity of the party plaintiffs to sue. 
The lower court denied the plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment; decided in favor of the defendants on 
their claim that certain portions of the pre-need law are 
unconstitutional; and found in favor of the plaintiffs, de-
claring that the plaintiffs had legal standing to prosecute 
the action and that there existed a justiciable issue between 
the plaintiffs and defendants. 
The court is respectfully ref ered to the final decree 
of the lower court as contained in the lower court's record 
on file herein ( R. 44-48) . 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The public officer defendants seek a clarification of 
the laws of the State of Utah involved in this controversy. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are set forth under the heading 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. 
ARGUMENT 
Inasmuch as briefs of the appellants and other respon-
dents in this action will cover all of the points in issue, the 
public officer defendants, in order to avoid repetition, will 
limit their argument. to the following points: 
POINT I. 
THE PROVISION IN THE CONTRACT USED 
BY DEFENDANT MEMORIAL TRUSTS, INC., 
WHICH PERMITS SAID DEFENDANT TO RE-
CEIVE THE EARNINGS OF THE TRUST 
FUND ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SEC-
TION 22-4-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, 
IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF SAID SECTION 
22-4-4. 
Section 22-4-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, reads as 
follows: 
"All payments and amounts so deposited, with 
all earnings and interest thereon, shall not be with-
drawn until the death of the sole or one of the 
beneficiaries, provided that said funds plus all in-
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terest and earnings shall be released to the payor 
originally paying said funds under the purchase 
agreement, and said payor shall be entitled to re-
ceive the same or any part thereof, at any time 
prior to the death of any beneficiary, upon demand 
upon said bank or trust company, and upon surren-
der of any pass book evidencing same." 
Paragraph IV of the contract used by defendant, 
Memorial Trusts, Inc., provides that the funds received 
.from the purchaser shall be placed in trust, and then con-
tains the following provision (R. 9) : 
"* * * The Memorial Purchaser hereby re-
vocably appoints Memorial Trusts, Inc. as agent to 
demand and receive earnings of the trust funds and 
to pay the same to itself in exchange for and in 
consideration of the agreement of Memorial Trusts, 
Inc .. , to guarantee the services and facilities above 
set forth regardless of future price increases. The 
Memorial Purchaser agrees upon request to make 
such dema;nd personally and pay said earnings to 
Memorial Trusts, Inc., if for any reason such earn-
ings are not so made available to Memorial Trusts, 
Inc., as a part of its general funds. * * *" 
The public officer defendants serving as the Business 
Regulation Commission of Utah have interpreted the above 
,• 
provision as not being in violation of Section 22-4-4. The 
basis for this interpretation is that Section 22-4-4 permits 
the purchaser to withdraw the trust funds and the interest 
and earning thereon at any time prior to the death of the 
beneficiary upon the surrender of his passbook, and there 
is nothing in the law which prohibits the purchaser from 
appointing an agent to receive said funds, particularly 
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since the appointment as agent is revocable. In effect, the 
purchaser retains control over the trust funds. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER 
OR NOT THE PRE-NEED CONTRACTS SOLD 
BY DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS ARE IN-
SURANCE CONTRACTS, AND SUBJECT TO 
THE INSURANCE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
There is some uncertainty in the minds of the public 
officer defendants as to whether the contracts of the cor .. 
porate defendants should be regulated under the Pre-ar-
ranged Funeral Plans law of the State of Utah or under the 
State's insurance laws. Obviously there would be no need 
for a Pre-arranged Funeral Plans law if all pre-need con-
tracts were subject to regulation as insurance contracts. It 
appears, however, that the Legislature contemplated that 
some contracts of this type would constitute insurance, as 
Section 22-4-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, of the Pre-ar-
ranged Funeral Plans Act, reads as follows : 
"This act shall not apply to or affect the opera-
tions and business of duly licensed associations or 
companies under the insurance laws of the state of 
Utah." 
While there is some division of authority as to whether 
or not contracts for future burial expenses constitute in-
surance, it appears that the majority of cases hold that 
they are insurance contracts. It is stated in Appleman on 
Insurance Law and Practice, Vol. 1, page 29, that: 
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"Often a group of people will band together 
and provide for the regular payment from each of 
them of a small premium, or else provide .for a small 
assessment from each one upon the death of any 
member, to pay the burial expenses of any person 
in that group. Often such associations are started 
by enterprising undertakers, who themselves often 
undertake to provide the necessary burial services, 
perhaps agreeing in advance to undertake them for 
a stipulated price. These contracts have come fre-
quently before the courts for construction. The al-
most uniform tendency of the courts has been to 
hold that they constitute life insurance, and as such, 
the organization not having been licensed or ap-
proved by the Insurance Commissioner, the entire 
scheme, and, necessarily, the individual contracts, 
are void." 
In the annotation on the subject in 63 A. L. R .. , page 
723, it is stated: 
"While the authorities are not agreed as to 
whether or not a contract for payment of burial ex-
penses is in the nature of an insurance contract, the 
majority of the cases answer this question in the 
affirmative, and regard the contract as one of in-
surance. * * *" 
Section 31-1-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, defines in-
surance as follows: 
''Insurance is a contract whereby one under-
takes to indemnify another or pay or allow a speci-
fied or ascertainable amount or benefit upon de-
terminable risk contingencies." 
As pointed out on pages 22 and 23 of appellants' brief, 
all of the contracts of defendants contain certain similari-
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ties. They promise to deliver, at some unknown future 
date, or on demand, certain funeral merchandise as yet un-
identified, and funeral services at the time death occurs. 
From the foregoing definition of insurance, it appears 
that the contracts of defendants contain the elements de-
scribed in the definition, except possibly the element of 
"spreading the risk over the group," which Justice Crockett 
said was a necessary element of insurance in his concurring 
opinion in In re Clark's Estate, 10 U. 2d 427., 354 P. 2d 
112, 119. Also see Helvering, Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue v. LeGierse et al., Executors, 312 U. S. 531, 539, 
61 S. Ct. 646, in which the United States Supreme Court 
said: 
"Historically and commonly insurance involves 
risk-shifting and risk-distributing. * * *" 
It is noted that the contracts of defendants provide 
that if the purchaser dies before having paid his contract 
in full, the full purchase price must be paid, or arrange-
ments made for its payment, before the merchandise or 
services contracted for are furnished. Thus, there is no 
sharing of risk as there is in the usual insurance contract. 
There is, however, an element of risk in that the defen-
dants do promise to furnish the merchandise and services 
contracted for at the contract price, regardless of possible 
future price increases. 
There are a number of cases in which the contention 
has been made that the benefits of the contract may be 
taken before the death of the purchaser and are, therefore, 
not contingent upon death. In South Georgia Funeral 
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Homes, Inc., et al. v. Harrison, 184 S. E. 875, the defen-
dant, sold option contracts in which he agreed, for the sum 
of $12.00 per year, to sell the optionee certain articles of 
merchandise and funeral services at a special cash price. 
The contract also provided that it could be renewed and ex-
tended by mutual consent of the parties from time to time 
at the rate of $1.00 per month, and that the optionees were 
not bound to exercise the option but were free to purchase 
the merchandise and services elsewhere. In holding that 
the contract was a contract of insurance, the court said: 
"The option contract is an agreement on the 
part of the 'optionor' to sell certain enumerated 
articles and services 'for the use of, or in connec-
tion with, said optionees and their minor children 
and other dependents, any or all of them.' While 
the exercise of the option is not expressly made con-
tingent upon the death of any of them, the mer-
chandise and services may be bought only for the 
use of, or in connection with, the 'optionees,' their 
minor children or dependents. As a general propo-
sition we cannot conceive of what use a casket, bur-
ial clothes, funeral direction, etc., would be to a liv-
ing person not engaged in the business of buying 
and selling such commodities. Burial merchandise 
and funeral services are peculiar commodities; they 
are presumably used only in connection with, or for 
the use of, a person who has departed life. For 
these reasons we are of the opinion that the exer-
cise of the option is contingent upon the death of 
the 'optionees,' their minor children or dependents. 
"The option contract provides that the 'op-
tionee' upon the exercise of the option shall have 
the right to buy from the 'optionor' certain mer-
chandise and services at cost plus certain additional 
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charges. This reduction in price is a benefit or 
something of value to the 'optionee.' Under the 
rulings in Benevolent Burial Association v. Harri-
son, 181 S. E. 829, section 56-901 of the Code of 
1933, which provides that 'a life insurance policy 
is a contract by which the insurer, for a stipulated 
sum, engages to pay a certain amount of money if 
another shall die within the time limited by the 
policy. The life may be that of the insured or of 
another in the continuance of whose life the insured 
has an interest,' is not exhaustive as to the medium 
of payment. 'Nor is it essential that loss, damage, 
or expense indemnified against necessarily be paid 
to the contractee. It may constitute insurance if it 
be for his benefit and a contract on which he, in 
case of a breach thereof, may assert a cause of ac-
tion. * * *' From these rulings it follows that 
the option contract is an insurance contract upon 
the life of the 'optionee,' his minor children and 
dependents." 
See also State v. Mynatt (Tenn. 1960) 339 S. W. 2d 
26; State v. Smith Funeral Service (Tenn. 1940) 145 S. W. 
2d 1021. 
In the case of State v. Globe Casket & Undertaking 
Co., 143 Pac. 878, the Supreme Court of Washington said: 
"* * * Its business is confined solely to the 
sale of the certificates named in its articles, and 
the performance, through the agency of others, of 
the obligations assumed thereby. These certificates 
are in two forms. In the one the corporation agrees, 
on the death of the holder, 'to take charge of the 
burial of said holder, and provide the necessary 
furnishing and materials therefor to the value of 
one hundred ($100) dollars, as follows: One black 
broadcloth, white or colored plush casket; one out-
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side box for casket; one hearse; two carriages; one 
burial robe; necessary embalming; necessary acces ... 
sories; and services of funeral director.' The other 
is similar in form, with the exception that it does 
not name the value of the furnishings, and provides 
that the corporation will take charge of the funeral 
of the holder 'on the surrender of this receipt,' and. 
will furnish the hearse and two carriages in places 
only where they are obtainable. Sales of the cer-
tificates are made through the agency of solicitors 
on the installment plan. * * * 
"As to the first contention, we think the busi-
ness is clearly insurance. The contract evidenced by 
the certificate has all of the elements of a life insur-
ance contract. It is an agreement to perform a ser-
vice which can become obligatory only on the death 
of the certificate holder. While no beneficiary of 
the promise is named, in reality one exists, and may 
be ascertained with as much certainty as if directly 
and specifically named. It is the person who would 
otherwise be obligated to pay the expenses of the 
burial. This may be the heir of estate of the de-
cedent, his relatives, or the state. * * *" 
For similar holdings, see Sisson v. Prata Undertaking 
Company, (R. I. 1928) 141 A. 76; State v. Stout (Tenn. 
1933) 65 S. W. 2d 827; Renschler v. State (Ohio 1914) 107 
N. E. 758. Annotations and addition} case citations on the 
subject are contained in 63 A. L. R. 711, 723; 68 A. L. R. 
1525; 100 A. L. R. 1449; 119 A. L. R. 1241. 
In conclusion, the public officer defendants are uncer-
tain as to whether or not the pre-need contracts involved 
in this matter are insurance contracts and subject to reg-
ulation under the insurance laws of the State. It appears 
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to said defendants, however., despite many decisions to the 
contrary, that said contracts lack a sharing of the type of 
risk necessary to constitute insurance. It further appears 
to said defendants that if said contracts provided that the 
merchandise and services contracted for would be fur-
nished to the purchaser without payment in full of the con-
tract price if the purchaser should die prior to having paid 
the complete price, that such a "sharing of the risk" ele-
ment would be present as to make such contracts insurance 
contracts. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE PREARRANGED FUNERAL 
PLANS ACT (SECTIONS 22-4-1, 22-4-2, 22-4-
3, 22-4-4, 22-4-5 and 22-4-7, UTAH CODE AN-
NOTATED 1953) IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The corporate defendant-respondents contend that the 
Pre-arranged Funeral Plans law (Sections 22-4-1 through 
22-4-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953) is unconstitutional in 
that it violates Article I, Sections 1 and 7, of the Constitu-
tion of Utah, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States. The public officer defendants 
maintain that said Act is constitutional and within the 
police power of the State. 
The Pre-arranged Funeral Plans law provides, among 
other things, that all funds received in payment of con-
tracts for the furnishing in the future of funeral services 
of merchandise in connection with the .funeral are trust 
funds which must be deposited in a bank or trust company. 
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Such funds, however, may be released, including any earn-
ings or interest, to the payor originally paying said funds 
under the purchase agreement. (Section 22-4-4, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, supra). It is apparently the position of 
the other defendant-respondents that these requirements 
attempt to prohibit or confiscate their business under the 
guise of regulation. 
The question of the constitutionality of statutes simi-
lar to Utah's Pre-Arranged Funeral Plans law has come 
before the courts several times in recent years, and it ap-
pears that the majority of decisions have sustained their 
constitutionality. Rather than set forth in this brief the 
lengthy arguments and reasoning found in these cases, the 
court's attention is directed to the case of Reserve Vault 
Corporation, et al., v. Clint Jones, et al., 356 S. W. 2d 225, 
which was decided in 1962 by the Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas, and which reviews completely the constitutional 
questions pertaining to prearranged funeral plan laws. 
This case also quotes extensively from the frequently cited 
cases of Memorial Gardens Association, Inc., v. Smith (Ill. 
1959) 156 N. E. 2d 587, and Falkner v. Memorial Gardens 
Association (Tex. 1957) 298 S. W. 2d 934. It also quotes 
from the excellent dissenting opinion found in State v. 
Memorial Gardens Development Company (W. Va. 1958) 
101 S. E. 2d 425,, 68 A. L. R. 2d 1233, which case held un-
constitutional a statute similar to Utah's. 
One of the arguments advanced for upholding statutes 
similar to Utah's Pre-Arranged Funeral Plans Act as a 
proper exercise of the police power of the State is the possi-
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bility of fraud in prearranged funeral contracts. This pos-
sibility is graphically illustrated by the following quota-
tion from State v. Mynatt (Tenn. 1960) 339 S. W. 2d 26: 
"A very important reason for the enactment 
of such legislation as we have is shown by the case 
before us. The defendant concedes that during the 
last 20 years he has issued some 35,000 of these 
contracts, and the record does not show how many 
of the contracts are now in .force and effect, but it 
is obvious that the potential liability is tremendous. 
"Let us assume that all 35,000 contracts are 
now in force and effect and that the personal repre-
sentatives of each contract should demand a $500 
funeral. The value of 35,000 funerals would amount 
to $17,500,000. Of this sum the defendant, by rea-
son of the 50% discount provision, would be liable 
for $8,750,000." 
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CONCLUSION 
The public officer defendants-respondents respectfully 
submit that the Pre-arranged Funeral Plans law of the 
State of Utah does not prevent a purchaser of a pre-need 
.funeral contract from appointing the seller as his agent to 
withdraw and keep the interest or earnings from the funds 
held in trust under the provision of Section 22-4-4, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953; that it appears to said defendants 
that the pre-need contracts involved in this controversy 
are not insurance contracts and are not subject to regula-
tion by the Utah Commissioner of Insurance; and that the 
Pre-arranged Funeral Plans law (Sections 22-4-1 through 
22-4-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953) is constitutional. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
H. WRIGHT VOLKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Public Officer Defendants 
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